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Executive Summary 
During the work in the AURES project, we have found evidence that auctions can be a suitable instrument for 
allocating support under budget and volume limitations and can achieve significant short-term efficiency gains, 
but it has not been proven that auctions in general are better suited to support renewable energy than other 
support instruments. 
The use of auctions entails several new implications that often policy makers have not had to deal with before: 
ensuring sufficient competition for a well-functioning price formation, avoiding undesired strategic incentives, 
collusion and other market distortions, and importantly dealing with risk of low realisation rates, e.g. caused by 
underbidding or the existence of non-cost barriers. Often, the specific design solutions for these issues are 
highly context-specific and what works in one market is not necessarily applicable to another. In addition, 
different design elements might mitigate some issues but affect other factors, e.g. pre-qualification rules and 
penalties can increase realisation rates but can also increase the risk and thus the costs for bidders. In 
addition, policy makers often pursue other policy goals (secondary objectives) with energy support policy, e.g. 
increasing security of supply or encouraging actor diversity. Finding a compromise between encouraging 
different policy goals without compromising on well-functioning price formation, proves to be a challenging 
task. Overall, auctions are only just emerging as instrument for allocating support of renewables and 
experiences so far are rather limited and mixed. 
Because of different market conditions, ongoing institutional learning processes and specific policy goals, we 
find that auction rules must be adaptable, and should therefore not be too restrictively determined in European 
level legislation. On the other hand, we find that there is a good case for addressing auctions in the new 
renewable energy directive (further referred to as REDII), in order to give guidance to the member states 
(further referred to as MS), encourage the application of best practices and help avoiding some of the many 
pitfalls related to auction design. 
For auctions, as with any other instrument, the typical principles of good policy making apply: a strong, long-
term policy framework is beneficial, with predictable developments. Retroactive changes should be avoided. 
Summary of recommendations for the role of auctions in REDII:  
Technology-neutral vs. technology-specific auctions: 
 A trade-off exists between designing an auction technology specific and technology neutral. Whether the 
advantages or disadvantages of technology-neutrality prevail depends on the level of technology costs, 
the market potential, technology differences in system integration costs and technology maturity. 
 REDII should allow for the application of technology-specific auctions so that auction design can be 
adapted to the specific needs of individual RES-technologies.  
 Technology clusters may be an option to foster competition between technologies instead of using pure 
technology-neutral auctions. 
Exemptions, alternatives to auctions: 
 REDII should allow de minimis rules on three grounds: type of actor, size of actor and size of projects.  
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 Exemptions for immature technologies and immature markets should be allowed. We do not recommend 
the use of auctions for demonstration projects.  
 REDII should give clear and unambiguous definitions on exemption rules. 
 In the expectedly rare cases that a thorough impact assessment ex ante predicts poor performance of an 
auction and no reasonable mitigation options exist, MS should be allowed to employ alternative support 
instruments (such as administratively set tariffs or premiums) independent of the exemption rules set out 
above. 
Auction type: 
 We suggest REDII not to prescribe any specific auction type.  
 We recommend REDII to require auctions to fulfil at least three criteria: 1) bids are binding, 2) best bids 
win, 3) winners receive at least their bid price. 
Auction schedule and frequency: 
 REDII should require MS to 1) publish a long-term auction roadmap, 2) publish more detailed auction 
plans for shorter time horizons, and 3) set up appropriate monitoring systems.  
 REDII should not prescribe any specific frequency of auctions.  
Auction volumes and limits: 
 REDII should allow MS to choose between generation-based and capacity-based volume setting in 
auctions. Budget caps may also be chosen if politically desired, but represent a less preferred option. 
Auction procedures: 
 REDII should require MS to set up appropriate processes and participation enhancing measures. This can 
include e.g. 1) process for stakeholder consultation, 2) sufficient consultation time, 3) sufficient time for 
bid preparation. In any case, project realisation time should be reasonable and consider typical project 
development cycles. 
Maximum / ceiling price: 
 We recommend that REDII requires MS to set ceiling prices that reflect market conditions and an 
assessment of the levelised cost (LCOE) of the technology. 
Pre-qualification requirements and penalties: 
 REDII should require MS to implement both pre-qualification requirements and penalties. We recommend 
leaving it open to each MS to decide on their specific design and levels.  
 Further, it is advisable to require pre-qualifications to be supported and justified by sufficient arguments in 
order to ensure transparency and to avoid an illegitimate exclusion of bidders. 
Selection criteria: price and potential secondary objectives: 
 We recommend that REDII explicitly mentions price as a preferred selection criterion. 
 MS should be allowed to consider further policy objectives within the auction design, particularly if 
required for public acceptance and reducing overall system cost.  
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 REDII should require MS to provide a detailed description and a reasoning of secondary objectives in 
auctions to provide a sufficient transparency level. In addition, the achievement of these secondary 
objectives should be measurable. 
Seller concentration rules: 
 It should be left for MS to decide whether to apply any seller concentration rules and, if applied, which 
type to opt for. 
 REDII could mention maximum size limits on bids as best practice, without mentioning any specific levels. 
Cross-border auctions: 
 REDII should provide a description of the options for cross border auctions as a guideline for MS who 
would like to cooperate.  
 It might be too early to fully enforce cooperation between MS at this point in time. We are thus in favour of 
a solution in which REDII requires that MS always investigate cross-border auctions as an option (i.e. in 
relation to mitigating suboptimal market conditions), but where the actual implementation is voluntary or 
based on sensible rules to gradually increase cross-border participation. 
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1 Auctions as a suitable instrument for REDII  
The AURES project midterm results confirm the increasing relevance of auctions in renewable energy 
support. Auctions can be a suitable instrument for allocating support under budget and volume limitations and 
can achieve significant efficiency gains, but it has not been proven that auctions in general are better suited to 
support renewable energy than other support instruments.  
Auctions can be a suitable instrument for RES support because of the prevailing decentralisation (asymmetry) 
of information about relevant variables (i.e. LCOE), policy goals of volume control, efficiency, and more. 
International experiences with auctions show that auctions can lead to reductions in support levels (in terms of 
the contracted price, premium or discounts achieved) and thereby increase the efficiency of support. 
However, auctions are in general an instrument that focuses on short-term (static) rather than on long-term 
(dynamic) efficiency. Whether auctions help drive down costs of less mature technologies is not possible to 
thoroughly assess, because its measurement requires longer time spans than what is currently available for 
analysis in past experiences with auction. 
Using auctions may lead to less overall RES deployment than other instruments (del Río and Linares 2014). It 
is a fundamental requirement for auctions that the tendered volume is less than the market potential in order 
to create sufficient competition. The inherent volume limitation may stand in contrast to the ‘at least’ nature of 
the RES target on European level: in practice, auctions may lead to treating RES targets as ‘maximum’ levels, 
even though this also depends on the way the auction volume is determined.  
Our empirical analysis has shown that no one-size-fits-all auction scheme exists. The auction design must be 
adapted to the specific framework and market conditions of a country; otherwise, the competitive outcome 
could be endangered. Specific conditions include the level of competition, participation of multi-project 
bidders, transparency of bidders, uncertainty about project costs and energy yield for both bidders and 
auctioneer, default risks, and the periodicity and frequency of the auction. Therefore, REDII must facilitate 
the flexibility that allows for adapting auction design to specific market conditions. Still, some 
learnings can be implemented as common principles. 
The use of auctions for renewable support is still in its beginnings. For many implementations, a 
comprehensive assessment is not possible yet, as realisation rates can only be measured years after the 
auction has taken place. In addition, many auction schemes are being changed over time, often between each 
auction undertaking. This implies that still a lot of learning is ongoing in policy making for RES auctions. REDII 
should provide sufficient flexibility in the rules and requirements for Member States (MS) to allow for 
further institutional learning. 
The performance of auctions relies on adequate competition levels. It is of utmost importance to design 
auctions for the best competition possible, also avoiding strategic bidding. A preventive measure against 
implicit collusion is to occasionally change auction rules (like conducted by the European Central Bank in the 
refinancing operations auctions). This also demands sufficient ’room to manoeuvre’ regarding auction design 
for MS (Asubel et al., 2014). 
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2 Technology-neutral vs. technology-specific auctions  
Technology-neutral support may lead to a higher static efficiency because RES technologies are in 
competition and those characterised by lowest generation costs are being utilised first. In a technology-
specific auction, on the other hand, the contributions of individual technologies are administratively set based 
on individual auction volumes. This may lead to the exploitation of RES potentials that would not be utilised 
under technology-neutral auctions (e.g. for offshore wind) and thus lead to higher generation cost. The focus 
on lowest generation cost in technology-neutral auctions, however, abstracts from the fact that the total costs 
caused by individual technologies are not limited to generation costs but also involve costs for e.g. system 
integration and that technologies might contribute with secondary benefits such as diversity and security of 
supply. These additional costs and benefits are – to the extent they are not reflected in the market value as 
seen by investors – not considered in the selection process in purely technology-neutral auctions. Different 
RES technologies may lead to very different costs for system integration and grid expansion. Therefore, 
technologies with lower generation costs might still lead to higher overall system costs. Technology-specific 
auctions (or rules within auctions) are a means to steer development towards the lowest overall system costs. 
Furthermore, it is not given that a cost minimisation in the static perspective of today’s cost structure is 
desirable for overall welfare. The assessment from a dynamic system perspective must consider additional 
aspects: Technology learning might reduce the costs of currently more expensive technologies in the future so 
strongly that they can replace the currently cost-effective technology choices. Hence, the total generation 
Examples 
(Static) efficiency gains from auctions 
Support levels in California fell from €79.5 per MWh in the first auction round to €70.5 per MWh in the third one 
(averaged across technologies) (CPUC, 2014). In Brazil, 60 % price reductions compared to the former FIT (i.e. 
Proinfa) indicate a high level of competition in the auctions leading to important efficiency gains (Held et al., 2014). 
Similarly, prices in South Africa have gone down in successive rounds, from R3.27 (€19ct) per kWh in the first round 
to R0.77 (€4ct) per kWh in the fourth round. In Germany, the average price of the first auction round was €91.7 per 
MWh. Over the next rounds, the price progressively declined to €72.3 per MWh (Wigand et al., 2016).  
Realisation rates  
Case studies also showed that full project realisation is rarely achieved, and delays are frequent (Wigand et al., 2016). 
At least 75% of projects - whose realisation period has ended - in California and South Africa have been built. Some 
countries including Brazil, France, and Italy, initially faced problems with relatively low realisation rates. Auction 
schemes in China, Denmark, and Portugal have now commissioned 100% of contracted capacities, albeit not without 
delays in some cases. In the UK, Netherlands, and Italy targeted budgets or capacities were not fully allocated. 
Importance of competition 
In Denmark, efficiency gains were made in all rounds except in the Anholt tender, where only one bidder participated 
in the auction (Kitzing & Wendring, 2015). This, together with the supply bottlenecks experienced at the time in the 
region, led to high contracting prices (€141 per MWh).  
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costs of a technology portfolio for the full transition period (e.g. until 2050) need to be considered in order to 
minimise overall generation costs over the whole time period. While technology neutrality in principle could 
provide strong incentives for cost reductions (to catch up with the cost competitive technologies), markets 
typically fail to deliver these cost reductions in the presence of e.g. learning spill-overs. Without the 
expectation of a guaranteed market for the result of innovation activities (e.g. provided by technology-specific 
auction volumes), it is unlikely that sufficient innovation takes place for technologies that needs a high degree 
of innovation e.g. immature technologies.  
It has also to be noted that technology-neutrality often leads to windfall profits for lower cost technologies in 
support schemes, which increases policy costs. The significance of this effect depends on the cost differences 
between the low and high cost technologies and is therefore very country specific. Windfall profits can be 
limited in technology-neutral auctions by setting technology-specific ceiling prices (like in the Netherlands). 
Nevertheless, low cost technologies will face limited competition and can bid up to their ceiling price, if the 
auction is cleared by a more expensive technology.   
Additional aspects need to be considered for auctions as support instrument in particular: Different 
technologies often require very different auction design, e.g. offshore wind and PV. This concerns different 
pre-qualification requirements, different degree of regulatory involvement in the planning procedures, different 
penalty regimes, and more. Treating all technologies equally may substantially undermine the performance of 
auctions, as some technologies may have structural competitive advantages (e.g. because of faster 
permitting) and as it may lead to strategic bidding (e.g. when PV developers have long grace periods, they 
may start to speculate on falling module prices). In addition, if technology neutrality leads to a reduction of 
investor diversity, this may decrease the level of competition and liquidity of auctions on the long run and 
hence increase policy costs.  
A trade-off exists between designing an auction technology specific and technology neutral. Whether the 
advantages or disadvantages of technology-neutrality prevail will depend on the level of technology costs, 
available market potential, technology differences in system integration costs and technology maturity. We 
find that some advantages and some disadvantages of technology neutrality reduce with decreasing cost 
differences of RES technologies. However, a number of design challenges remain. Thus, REDII should still 
leave flexibility to MS to adequately design their auctions in a technology-specific manner. MS wishing 
to introduce strong competition between technologies may want to opt for technology clusters instead of pure 
technology neutrality to avoid high windfall profits of the cheapest technologies. These technology clusters, 
however, must be carefully designed in order to avoid the problems that have occurred in practice. 
 
 
Examples for empirical evidence with multi-technology auctions in the EU  
Most of the countries using auctions to determine the support level for RES-technologies have implemented a 
technology-specific auction scheme in light of various policy goals (Wigand et al., 2016). However, Brazil applied 
technology-neutral auctions in parallel to technology-specific auctions, and California and the UK opted for multi-
technology auctions by grouping either according to the generation profile of RES (California) or the maturity level 
(UK). The Netherlands introduced technology-neutral auctions with some technology specific criteria, e.g. the different 
maximum prices per technology.   
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3 Exemptions from auctions 
3.1 Exemptions based on de minimis rules 
De minimis rules can be defined on three grounds: type of actor, size of actor and size of projects. First, 
meeting renewable energy targets requires public acceptance and the access to all suitable sites for project 
development. In some MS, public acceptance is strongly related to the type of actors developing projects. 
Making sure that they can still develop projects is therefore of greater benefit for RES target achievement and 
would possibly justify exemptions based on the type of actor, e.g. investors that are local citizens. The 
definition of which actors to exempt from auctions is highly context specific and cannot be commonly defined. 
It should be required, however, to define actor-type de minimis rules in such a way that options for abuse can 
be avoided and competition within the auction is not undermined. 
Second, auctions are particularly difficult for small actors as they have – by definition – a smaller portfolio. 
This reduces their possibility to mitigate the risk of not being successful in the auction. Consequentially small 
actors can be crowded out. Exemptions based on the size of actors could therefore be justified on the basis of 
non-discrimination. Preferential treatment for small actors within the auction could increase the liquidity of the 
auction through greater participation, competition and lead to a more efficient result. However, there is also a 
risk that larger actors will find creative strategies to define themselves as small actors and benefit from the 
preferential treatment. 
Third, exemptions based on the size of projects may help to reduce transaction cost, which are relatively 
higher for smaller projects both for investors and for the administration, yet there is no direct correlation 
between the size of projects and the size or type of actors. The State Aid Guidelines refer to exemptions 
based on the size of projects, allowing administratively determined feed-in-premiums for projects below 1 MW 
except wind onshore (6 MW or 6 units). As for solar, the 1 MW de minimis rule exempts the residential sector 
and large parts of the commercial sector, which seems reasonable. As for onshore wind, a certain project size 
limit seems problematic, as there is no natural segmentation in the market. Any definition would be arbitrary 
and would cut off the market at the point of technological progress. De minimis rules based on the number of 
turbines (e.g. 6 turbines or less) risks that projects are artificially reduced in size. In addition, available 
Empirical evidence with technology-neutral auctions used in the 1990’s in the UK and Ireland has shown a limited 
ability of technology-neutral auctions to promote technologies with different maturity levels. The more expensive 
technologies were not promoted in the UK, where waste-to-energy and onshore wind dominated (Mitchell & Connor, 
2004). No biomass-anaerobic digestion or offshore wind projects were commissioned in the Irish Alternative Energy 
Requirement (AER) programme. Experiences with the use of technology baskets from the recent UK auctions also 
indicate some problems. Firstly, the overall budget or available capacity still need to be distributed between pots. In 
the UK's most recent auction, for example, the budget reserved for 'less mature' technologies was three times the 
budget for mature technologies. Similar to technology-specific auctions, grouped auctions can still lead to static 
efficiency losses. 
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locations may be reduced, leading to allocation inefficiencies. A more natural segmentation would be to 
exempt small wind turbines (according to IEC norm below 100kW). 
Side issue: clear definitions are crucial 
For onshore wind, the current State Aid Guidelines led to confusion on the possibly exempted project size. It is 
unclear whether the definition includes projects that comprise of 6 turbines of 6 MW (36 MW in total) or a 6 MW 
project size (e.g. 2 turbines of 3 MW).  
In summary, REDII should allow MS to define de minimis rules on any of the three grounds: the type of 
actor (to increase acceptance), the size of actor (protecting small actors from being most impacted) 
and the size of projects (to decrease transaction costs). Combinations (e.g. exemptions of small projects 
of certain type of actors) should also be allowed but it should be ensured that the volume within the auction 
remains sufficiently high in order to profit from the competitive allocation of RES potentials in an auction. 
 
3.2 Exemptions for immature technologies, immature markets and 
demonstration projects 
Immature technologies may have very few potential projects (and thus bidders), high risks and uncertain 
costs, limited commercial experience on the part of the developers and other characteristics, which make 
them eligible for exemption from an auctioning system. As Batlle et al. (2011) and Kitzing & Mitchell (2014) 
point out, quantity-based and competitive instruments such as auctions entail large market risks for private 
investors, and may therefore be less appropriate for triggering the necessary dynamic processes for 
sustainable growth, which is needed to lift technologies into market maturity. In case of demonstration phase 
projects, auctions are even less suitable, since there is often no competition possible because demonstration 
projects are per se ‘one of a kind’. For these reasons, auctions appear to be less appropriate for creating a 
dynamic, multi-project market for immature technologies and demonstration projects. We recommend REDII 
not to prescribe auctions for new/immature technologies and demonstration projects. The choice of 
support instrument for immature technologies or immature markets should be left to MS, and exemptions for 
immature technologies or markets should be allowed under certain conditions. In particular, we do not 
recommend the use of auctions for demonstration project at all. 
REDII could guide towards identifying which technologies are immature, by proposing a methodology 
to define ‘immature’ technologies and markets. This can include comparing the levelised cost of electricity 
Examples for de minimis rules  
Actor type rules 
Germany uses an energy cooperative definition in which at least 51% of voting rights have to be held by at least 10 
local natural citizens. 
Actor size rules 
The EU definition of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME)  
Project size thresholds for solar PV 
France: 100kW, Germany: 750kW, the Netherlands: 15kW, Italy: 5MW, the UK 5MW 
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(LCOE) of the immature to those of more established technologies, and considering the market maturity of a 
technology in a certain country, e.g. expressed by a minimum market share of a technology.   
Clear guidance on what constitutes a demonstration project can help reduce uncertainty for investors. Criteria 
for establishing whether a technology is in the demonstration phase may reflect the volume of existing 
installation in comparable geographical environments, the degree of divergence from mature energy 
technologies (requiring that innovations are substantial rather than incremental) and the proportion of the 
installation CAPEX which is deemed innovative (a proxy for the level of technology risk borne by the 
developer). 
Side issue: clear definitions are crucial 
The challenge is to define ‘immature’ technologies and demonstration projects. Besides the matureness of the 
technologies, country-specific characteristics such as the matureness of the markets should be taken into account. 
Deciding what qualifies a technology as being at the 'demonstration' phase is likely to be highly context specific. A 
blanket qualification based on a technology being first of a kind (FOAK) in Europe is inappropriate. That a 
technology has been demonstrated in one geographical context does not immediately mean that it should 
participate in auctions in all other contexts. Some energy technologies, for example, may have been demonstrated 
in one marine environment such as the North Sea, building understanding that may be of limited applicability in 
another such as the Atlantic or Mediterranean. It could also be the case that although the core generation 
technology such as a wind turbine generator is proven, other elements such as the foundation of an offshore wind 
turbine is new. Enabling national and European policy-makers to encourage innovation by exempting some 
installation types from auctions is vital for long-term cost reduction. 
 
 
3.3 Exemptions due to market conditions 
The applicability of auctions should always be tested for each implementation and its specific framework and 
market conditions. If sub-optimal results can be expected from auctions, it may be preferable to revert to other 
instruments. REDII should give MS the opportunity for implementing alternative support instruments if a 
comprehensive impact assessment ex ante predicts poor performance of an auction and no mitigation options 
are reasonable. 
Sub-optimal results from auctions may be expected because of:  
 Low number of projects or sites (or number of bidders in a single-site auction) 
Examples for non-suitability of auctions for immature technologies 
The experience in the UK with the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligations (NFFO) has shown that applying auctions as support 
mechanism for immature technologies involves a high risk of non-realisation, as successful bidders may not be able to 
implement their projects if they underestimate their costs (winners curse) (Butler & Neuhoff, 2008). A comparison of 
the NFFO with the German feed-in tariff system in the same decade revealed that the NFFO not only resulted in lower 
deployment rates but also in lower price reductions – a finding that appears intuitively surprising. Although the 
tendering scheme resulted in a larger price competition among investors, it was unable to generate sufficient 
competition among turbine producers and constructors. As Butler & Neuhoff (2008) stress, these stages of the value 
chain, however, are most important for overall price reductions, especially for less established technologies. 
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 Collusive bidding / concentrated market expected 
 Low market maturity / inexperienced bidders 
If only a very low number of projects or sites are available, i.e. ready for bidding, then securing sufficient 
competition can be a problem. Often, this can be mitigated by design changes (e.g. smaller auction volume, 
lower pre-qualification requirements etc.), but sometimes no reasonable mitigation options exist. Then, 
alternatives to auctions should be pursued. The same issue exists with risk of collusive bidding, or 
concentrated markets. 
In situations of low market maturity and inexperienced bidders, it may sometimes be preferable to revert to 
alternatives, especially in combination with a large development back-log and many projects in the pipeline. 
These conditions may lead to bids not reflecting the true costs, may it be because bidders are not capable of 
estimating them, have strategic interests or are desperate to winning. All these issues may be mitigated by 
design (e.g. using pay-as-bid instead of uniform pricing, introduce minimum or maximum prices, etc.).  
The applicability of auctions in situations that have a risk of leading to sub-optimal results should be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis via impact assessments. The assessment should also include the analysis of 
mitigation options. REDII could require MS to explore the following mitigation options before dismissing 
auctions: 
1. Improved auction design 
2. Adapted national conditions  
3. Initiated / intensified cross-border / regional cooperation with other MS 
We recommend that in the expectedly rare cases that a thorough impact assessment ex ante predicts 
poor performance of an auction scheme and no reasonable mitigation options exist, MS should be 
allowed to employ alternative support instruments (such as administratively set tariffs or premiums) 
independent of the technology, installation size or type. 
 
 
Examples for sub-optimal auction outcomes 
Few eligible bidders 
In France, one of the two auctions schemes for PV affects installations with a capacity between 100 and 250kW. 
Intended to target private small actors, however, all of the early auction rounds attracted only few eligible bidders. The 
resulting low competition further led to high support levels (support levels under the previous FIT were on average €2-
3 Cent/kWh lower than those of the auction) (Förster, 2016).  
Underbidding 
In Spain, the first RES auction was conducted in January 2016 for onshore wind and biomass. It followed a multi-
annual moratorium, which suspended support payments and resulted in a long pipeline of projects and heavy 
pressure for investors to win in the auction. Consequently, the investors bid very aggressively and the majority of bids 
were unreasonably low. Although it is too early to draw concrete insights from the auctions (projects do not have to be 
built before 2020), there are reasonable doubts whether it is possible to implement the projects under such low 
support levels (Del Rio, 2016). 
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4 Design of auctions 
In this section, we elaborate on the design of auctions and suggest which design elements should be 
regulated by the REDII, harmonised or left to the decision of MS. We base our suggestions on experiences 
gained in the context of the AURES project, including considerations from economic theory and experiences 
from past auctions. We suggest that general design principles should be established in REDII to ensure 
stability for investors, limitation of support costs and target achievement, whilst decisions on other 
implementation details should be left to MS. 
 
Prescribe 
specific rules 
in REDII 
Prescribe 
principles in 
REDII 
Give options 
/ guidance in 
REDII 
Leave open 
to MS 
Auction type  x  x 
Auction schedule x    
Auction volumes and limits   x  
Auction frequency    x 
Maximum / ceiling price x x   
Pre-qualification and penalties x    
Price as selection criterion x    
Secondary objectives    x 
Seller concentration rules   x  
Auction procedures x x   
Transferability of support licences    x 
 
4.1 Auction type  
Auctions for RES are usually multi-unit procurement auctions. Within this group there are many different types 
used. Depending on the particular market conditions, those different auction types may be appropriate. 
However, there are three general principles that every conducted auction should fulfil.    
1. The submitted bids are binding. 
2. The bidders with the best bids win. 
3. The winning bidders receive at least their bid price. 
There are different possibilities to define the best bid. In most cases the best bids just mean the bids with the 
lowest prices. Nevertheless, it is possible to include other criteria in the evaluation process. Possible criteria 
are for example actor diversity or a certain geographic distribution. 
Three fundamental types of auctions (static, dynamic and hybrid) fulfil these criteria, and are all relevant and 
were already conducted as auctions for renewable energy. In general, all of those three types can be further 
segmented by their payment rule which is either discriminatory or has uniform prices. In the light of similar 
auction results regarding different auction types, we suggest REDII not to prescribe the auction type for 
MS but to require the auction to fulfil the three criteria set out above. This allows MS to choose the 
suitable auction type for their specific market situation and policy objectives. 
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4.2 Auction schedule and frequency 
A long term auction schedule is highly relevant in order to ensure a framework of certainty for investors. This 
certainty not only avoids unnecessary investor risks but also unfavourable auction outcomes. Such outcomes 
may be (too) aggressive or even desperate bidding due to late project realisation phases and lacking visibility 
of future opportunities to receive support.  
 
Therefore, REDII should require MS to set up long term, forward-looking auction schedules. The 
requirement may be relaxed in case of cross-border cooperation, where investors have access to different 
national or cross-national auction schedules.  
In order to increase flexibility for the auctioning authority while accommodating the need for investor certainty 
we recommend a two-step approach. The first step is an auction roadmap with a time horizon of up to 10 
years (but at least 3-5 years). This roadmap should provide security for investors and the overall power 
system and should at least contain the following: 1) scope and timing of auctions; 2) auction volumes; 3) 
adaptation process. From the roadmap, it should become clear which technologies and installation sizes will 
be auctioned at which frequencies. Volumes should be defined for each planned auction in the roadmap and 
at least at an annual level. Acknowledging that plans must be adjustable, e.g. to correct for low realisation 
rates or unclaimed support rights from previous auction rounds, a transparent adaptation process should be 
defined, establishing e.g. review periods, timing and procedures for volume and scope adjustment. We 
recommend that the auction roadmap should be updated and adapted for example every 2 years. 
The second step is a more detailed description of the upcoming auctions and should be published at least 
every 2 years for the next 2 years. Depending on country and technology characteristics, the frequency of this 
more detailed planning can be adjusted (e.g. for offshore wind, where auctions are usually conducted less 
often, a more reasonable time frame may be 3-4 years). This forward-looking detailed schedule is important, 
as experiences with auctions so far have taught that only a sufficiently broad time plan allows investors to 
prepare well-conceived bids, leading to reasonable auction outcomes. Thus, the auction schedule must be the 
more detailed the closer the date of the auction is. The detailed auction schedule should not only feature the 
timing of each of the upcoming auctions but also details on the auction design as well as the auction 
procedures.  
The optimal frequency of an auction depends very much on the technology to be auctioned and the market 
situation. It is always a challenge to balance increased risks for investors in case of a low frequency with 
higher transaction costs and fluctuations in the competition level in case of a high frequency. Countries with a 
small market or low target volumes and technologies with long lead times (such as offshore wind) need a 
Examples for lacking auction schedules 
The Spanish auction in January 2016 was a one-time-only auction and experienced very aggressive bidding that, 
together with a uniform pricing rule, resulted in zero support levels with arguably low expectations on realisation rates 
(Del Rio, 2016).  
In the UK-CfD auction the absence of any confirmation of when the next auction round was going to take place may 
have played a role in the decision of one solar PV developer to submit a bid that was commercially unviable for a 
project that was ready to be built (Fitch-Roy & Woodman, 2016). 
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lower auction frequency than bigger markets and technologies with short lead times (such as PV). Due to the 
specific needs with regards to technologies and market situation, REDII should not prescribe any specific 
frequency of auctions. Our recommendations regarding auction volumes and procedures are discussed in 
sections 4.3 and 4.4 below.  
In addition, REDII should include a requirement to monitor the auction process and outcomes in order to 
facilitate institutional learning and policy improvement processes. Important aspects for such monitoring are, 
next to the price outcomes, e.g. realisation rates and competition levels. A part of the monitoring could also be 
to setting up early warning systems to identify delays in project realisation. Identifying delays at an early stage 
helps to constructively address the issue in a timely manner (Wigand et al., 2016). 
In summary, REDII should require MS to publish a long-term auction roadmap, more detailed auction 
plans for shorter time horizons and to set up appropriate monitoring systems. 
 
4.3 Auction volume and limits 
The auction volume or cap can be set explicitly in form of electricity generation (MWh to be delivered) or 
capacity (MW to be installed), or implicitly as budget cap (mEUR of support budget claimable). Since the EU 
RES targets are set as percentage of electricity demand, generation-based volumes could be expected to 
work best in terms of predictable target achievement. Under budget-based auctions, the amount of generation 
will be most uncertain. Capacity caps are rather straightforward for bidders and auctioneers and make the 
assessment of effectiveness easy and quick (realisation rate can be measured as soon as capacity is 
installed). Capacity-based volumes also give the strongest signal to equipment manufacturers and developers 
about the relevant market size for the future, and may therefore lead to further cost reductions from innovation 
and supply chain improvements.  
When choosing generation-based volume setting, the contract volumes should not be set too stringent for 
RES producers who are dependent on resource availability. Annual delivery periods are probably too 
stringent, e.g. for wind and its seasonal variations. Generation-based volume setting may also cause 
difficulties with changed market conditions for eligible technologies, e.g. if rules regarding priority dispatch or 
priority access are changed. This should be considered when contracting volumes and when defining penalty 
rules. 
Examples for auction frequencies in selected countries 
Less than once per year Once per year More than once per year 
DK (offshore wind) 
IRE (multi-technology) 
IT (multi-technology) 
NL (multi-technology) 
UK (multi-technology) 
DE (solar, 3 times p.a.) 
FR (solar, 1-3 times p.a.) 
PT (onshore wind, biomass, 1-2 times p.a.) 
CAL (multi-technology (mostly solar), 1-2 times p.a.) 
BRA (multi-technology, 2 times p.a.) 
SA (hydro, biomass, landfill gas) 
Source: Wigand et al (2016) 
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REDII should allow MS to choose between generation-based and capacity-based volume setting in 
auctions. Budget caps may also be chosen if politically desired, but represent a less preferred option 
due to the high complexity and the associated increased uncertainty for investors. 
As mentioned in section 4.2, in order to increase the flexibility for the auctioning authority, we recommend that 
plans for e.g. the total budget should be established for a longer time horizon and then the volume of 
individual auctions can be adapted in regards to the progress of the individual auction rounds (rolling auction 
budget). 
 
4.4 Procedures and participation enhancing measures 
Attracting the largest number of participants possible is an important success factor for auctions. In the 
AURES case studies, we have found that participation can be facilitated by a transparent and inclusive design 
and implementation process, together with the incorporation of feedback from developers into the final auction 
specifications (Wigand et al., 2016). Stakeholder dialogue meetings are a crucial aspect in this. In addition, 
auction material should be made public early in the process (as draft for consultation). Furthermore, a 
sufficiently lenient time plan is important for the success of an auction. This improves auction design and 
allows well-prepared bids. These processes can take up to several months.  
REDII should require MS to set up appropriate processes and can give guidelines on what appropriate 
in different cases may mean. This can e.g. include:  
1. Discuss tender specification draft with industry / conduct at least one stakeholder dialogue meeting 
before final tender material is published  
2. Give at least 15-30 days consultation period for the draft specifications  
3. Allow at least 60-90 days for bid preparation  
In any case, the auction process should define reasonable project realisation periods, considering typical 
project development cycles and required project progress (“early” or “late” auction). 
Realisation periods differ largely between different technologies. While e.g. the realisation of offshore wind 
projects may take up to several years, solar projects can often be realised within a few months. This aspect 
may cause issues in technology-neutral auctions if they allow for only one grace period independent of the 
Examples for auction volume setting 
Budget caps have so far been introduced in the Netherlands, Italy and the UK. Capacity caps are used in all other 
auction implementations in Europe and most auctions around the world as of today (Wigand et al., 2016). 
In the planned auctions in Poland, volumes are contracted as averages over a three-year period, with penalties 
applying if delivery is less than 85% over the period (Kitzing & Wendring, 2016). This approach has generally been 
accepted as feasible by the local industry. 
A design feature used in the Brazilian auctions are ‘adjustable volumes’, where a ‘demand parameter’ is introduced to 
force a minimum level of competition: if equal to 1.5, the auction’s supply must be at least 50% higher than the total 
volume (Wigand et al., 2016).  
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technology. It can either increase the risk of delay (for technologies with long realisation periods) or allow 
investors to speculate on decreasing costs (for technologies with short realisation periods). 
 
 
4.5 Maximum or ceiling prices 
By defining a maximum support level, ceiling prices offer a strong potential to control policy costs. They can 
also help to mitigating windfall profits in case of limited competition. All MS except France have already 
implemented ceiling prices in some form. However, setting the ceiling price appropriately remains challenging, 
especially in a multi-technology context. If there is little competition and the ceiling price significantly exceeds 
the cost of a particular technology, bidders may orient their bids towards the ceiling prices rather than their 
real costs, making the auction ineffective. If the ceiling price is set lower than the technology cost, the auction 
risks becoming unattractive for investors, leading to fewer bids and in the worst case to problems achieving 
renewable energy targets. Bidders may also perceive the introduction of a ceiling price as a signal that the 
auctioneer is anticipating low competition, causing them to exaggerate their bids. This issue may be overcome 
by a stipulation from the European Commission to mandate the setting of a ceiling price in all auctions. Since 
ceiling prices offer a strong potential to control policy costs and discretionary implementation may distort 
competition, we recommend that REDII requires MS to set ceiling prices that reflect market conditions and 
an assessment of the technology cost. 
In technology-neutral or multiple-technology auctions, either a common ceiling price can be implemented for 
all technologies or ceiling prices can be differentiated according to different technology cost. Both options 
have advantages and disadvantages. A technology-neutral ceiling price creates e.g. an incentive for lower 
Examples for participation enhancing measures 
Barriers from auction design that decreased participation 
The offshore wind auction Anholt in Denmark serves a perfect example for an auction with too little competition (only 
one bidder). The auction was characterised by a lack of possibilities for investors to discuss the auction conditions and 
entailed relatively strict penalties for delays as well as a tight time schedule (Kitzing & Wendring, 2015). Further, the 
material relevant for the auction was only published in Danish and investors also had the opportunity to participate in a 
concurrent yet financially more attractive auction in the UK. The lack of competition eventually resulted in a support 
level that was considerably larger compared to similar auctions for offshore wind in Denmark. 
Adjustment of auction design that increased participation 
The introduction of an open dialogue between investors and contracting authorities which included not only written 
consultation of the draft tender material (in English) but also several stakeholder information and discussion meetings, 
resulted in several adjustments of the auction design and improved the results for subsequent auctions.  
 
Examples for implemented realisation periods  
 Less than 2 years 2-3 years More than 3 years 
Offshore wind UK BRA DK, IT, NL 
Solar PV FR, UK, SA DE, BRA  
Onshore Wind UK, SA IT, CHN  
Geothermal Energy UK  IT 
Hydro UK  IT, BRA 
Biomass UK, SA  IT 
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cost technologies to bid above their cost, close to the ceiling price. But also technology-specific ceiling prices 
can cause inefficiencies, especially when there are large cost deviations within technology groups. To date all 
MS (including the technology neutral Dutch SDE+ and the grouped British CfDs) have differentiated ceiling 
prices. We recommend that in multi-technology auctions MS should be free to implement technology-
specific ceiling prices to account for cost asymmetries between technologies. 
There are two main options for calculating ceiling prices, an approach based on an assessment of levelised 
cost of electricity (LCOE) and an approach based on opportunity costs. Compared to an opportunity cost 
approach, an LCOE-based approach provides a realistic production cost assessment and thereby increases 
the chance of RES target achievement while reducing the risk of windfall profits. We therefore suggest that 
REDII prescribes the use of an LCOE-based approach for calculating ceiling prices. 
When applying the LCOE-based approach, the ceiling price should be calculated from the perspective of a 
typical investor. Consequentially, the methodology should take the broader regulatory framework and 
transaction costs into account (taxes and tax exemption, market risk premiums, financing conditions etc.). As 
auctions increase risks for investors (as compared to administratively set feed-in tariffs) the ceiling price 
should also account for this risk – otherwise the ceiling price may become too stringent and thereby impede 
competition.  
A suggested ceiling price calculation is given below. 
     
 
        
      
 
   
 
  
      
 
   
 
 LCOE = Levelised cost of electricity 
 It = Investment in the year t 
 Mt = Operations and maintenance expenditures in the year t 
 Ft = Fuel expenditures in the year t 
 Et = Electricity generation in the year t 
 r = Discount rate 
 n = economic lifetime of the system 
Adjustment of ceiling prices on a regular basis is likely to be required as LCOE of renewables develop. Within 
the auction, three procedures to adjust prices exist. First, an administrative authority could recalculate the 
LCOE and the ceiling price on a regular basis. Second, the ceiling prices could be indexed to economic 
indicators (such as steel prices etc.) and changed automatically or by discretion of the auctioning authority. 
Third, ceiling prices could be adjusted based on the auction outcomes of previous rounds. The first option 
involves regular transaction cost but is well established in many MS with feed-in tariffs, the second option 
requires higher transaction cost to set up the methodology and the third option requires some attention to 
avoid strategic bidding. There is no preferred option and the method of choice for updating ceiling prices 
should be left to MS. 
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4.6 Pre-qualification requirements and penalties  
An important aspect of designing an auction is to implement adequate pre-qualification requirements and 
penalties. Both are necessary in order to ensure serious bids and to select realisable projects, especially 
when dealing with inexperienced bidders. There are three types of re-qualification criteria: Restrictions, 
material pre-qualification and financial pre-qualification: Restrictions reduce the potential auction participants 
to only certain classes of bidders, and is therefore likely to result in less competition and higher support levels. 
Material pre-qualifications are typically project specific and occur at a cost for the bidder, potentially resulting 
in more aggressive bidding behaviour. Financial pre-qualification requires bidders to present a financial 
guarantee. The financial pre-qualification is usually linked to penalties, as the guarantees can be retained in 
case the bidder does not live up to its contractual liabilities. 
Pre-qualification and penalties are important to ensure project realisation after the auction and to prevent 
implementation delays. On the other hand, both pre-qualification requirements and penalties may also lead to 
low participation rates and thus to low competition in the auction if set up too strictly. Particularly, smaller or 
private actors may experience strict pre-qualification criteria as a barrier, e.g. high bid bonds require a high 
creditworthiness. Striking an appropriate balance between pre-qualification requirements and penalties is 
therefore of key importance, as well as adapting penalties to local circumstances. Implementing inadequately 
low pre-qualification and penalty levels may attract speculators. 
Pre-qualification requirements have been set in all countries examined by the AURES project, but the 
requirements vary with respect to e.g. technical or geographical specifications, the developer’s experience or 
the developer’s financial competences. While early tenders often entailed no penalties, often leading to low 
realisation rates, MS have lately chosen a mix of strategies to discourage delays and non-realisation of 
projects, including the enforcement of bid bonds (see table in the Example box below), support reduction, and 
reductions in support duration in cases of delay. 
Bid bonds are often connected to the penalty level, and can be retained by the auctioneer in case of project 
delay or non-compliance. This link is recommended in order to ensure that the penalty is actually paid in case 
it should be required. Bid bonds can be asked for in two stages, but the detailed design should be the decision 
of the MS. For example, a first bid bond is retained once a bidder wins the auction but then withdraws from 
signing a support agreement. A second bid bond can be retained in case an investor has signed an 
agreement but then fails to complete the project within a certain pre-specified time frame.  
REDII should require MS to implement both pre-qualification requirements and penalties. However, 
since they have to be case specific in order to be effective, we recommend leaving it open to each MS to 
decide on their specific design and levels. EC should provide support for deciding on the type of pre-
qualification/penalty e.g. by setting up guidelines or by providing best case examples. 
It may be advisable to require pre-qualifications to be supported and justified by sufficient arguments in order 
to ensure transparency and to avoid an illegitimate exclusion of some bidders.   
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4.7 Selection criteria: Price and possible secondary objectives 
When achieving a low price is the principal objective of auctions, then price should be a main selection 
criterion in RES auctions. Since market competition and increase in efficiency is a main objective for the 
European Commission in the introduction of auctions, we recommend that REDII explicitly mentions price 
as a preferred selection criterion.  In addition, auction design should be kept as simple as possible. 
However, the auctioneer may pursue further objectives in an auction including a certain geographic 
distribution of power plants, the promotion of actor diversity, the development of the domestic industry and 
value chain, and system integration aspects. Although the inclusion of secondary objectives in auction design 
may reduce static efficiency, other benefits may be achieved. For instance, implementing regional quotas for 
wind or solar power can lead to a more beneficial spatial distribution of RES-power plants, thus facilitating a 
more cost-efficient system integration and reducing overall system cost. Another example are rules that 
promote small and local actors to enhance their participation options, so ensuring broader social acceptance 
of RES.  
Secondary objectives can be addressed within auction design. When including a secondary objective in the 
auction design the basic options are i) to include it as a selection criterion, or ii) to include it in form of a 
material pre-qualification criterion. If the secondary objective is considered as a selection criterion in the 
auction, all projects can participate, but those that perform well in the requested criterion are rewarded with 
extra points and are thus more likely to win. We recommend to leave it open to MS if they would like to 
consider further objectives within the auction design, particularly if required for public acceptance and 
reducing overall system cost. However, REDII should require MS to provide a detailed description and a 
Pre-qualifications and penalties in different countries 
Denmark imposed no penalties in the first two auctions for single-site offshore wind, which led winners to renegotiate 
the support levels in the first auction and to cancel the contract after the second auction (Kitzing & Wendring, 2015). 
The introduction of penalties entailed an implementation of all projects since then, however, too stringent 
requirements and too high penalties in the subsequent Anholt tender severely hampered competition (only one 
bidder).  
In the NFFO auction in United Kingdom, no penalties led to low overall realisation rate of 26% (Fitch-Roy & Woodman, 
2016) 
In France, unclear pre-qualification requirements resulted in only 60% eligible bids. Particularly, in-experienced 
bidders were excluded by the requirements. This reduced competition and led to support levels that were higher than 
those paid under the previous FIT (Förster, 2016). 
Examples 
Bid bonds sizes applied in different auctions 
Country Technology focus First bid bond Second bid bond 
Portugal Wind and biomass €10 per kW €25 per kW 
Germany Solar PV €4 per kW €50 per kW 
Spain On shore wind and biomass - €20 per kW 
Italy Multi 5% of estimated investment costs 10% of estimated investment costs 
Source: Rosenlund Soysal (2016) 
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reasoning of the rules regarding secondary objectives in order to provide a sufficient transparency level. 
In addition, the achievement of these secondary objectives should be measurable. 
 
 
4.8 Seller concentration rules 
Lack of competition is arguably one of the most detrimental barriers for well-functioning auctions. One factor 
behind this problem is the concentration of the whole budget in one successful bidder, which could possibly 
result in a higher bidding price than without such concentration. Options for implementing seller concentration 
rules in order to mitigate the risk of market power include setting a minimum number of bidders under which 
the auction will not be carried out, limiting the size of bids per bidder and limiting the number of rounds in 
which bidders can participate. In principle, none of the options is inherently superior to others. The choice may 
depend on the specific market situation and technology, and participation may indirectly be enhanced by other 
design elements as well (e.g. pre-qualification requirements). Therefore, it should be left for MS to decide 
whether to apply any seller concentration rules or which type to opt for. 
Maximum size limits on bids (e.g. max. 10 MW per installation) can encourage the participation of smaller 
actors and help avoid market concentration, but limit economies of scale. The optimum level of the size limit 
depends highly on the auctioned volume, the average size of installations, and other market conditions. REDII 
could mention maximum size limits on bids as best practice against market concentration, without 
mentioning any specific levels. 
Training and development of workforce 
The Danish offshore wind auctions pursue a participatory approach including an open dialogue with stakeholders on 
tender specifications and framework conditions. In addition, the single-item auction for an offshore wind farm Horns 
Rev 3 required bidders to show that a certain number of trainees will be involved in wind farm construction. Such type 
of measures has certainly contributed to high acceptance of a large part of the population supporting the further 
development of offshore wind in Denmark (Held et al., 2014). 
Domestic industry 
The UK CfD auction asks projects larger than 300 MW to submit a supply chain plan to show how their project would 
promote innovation, competition, and skills (Fitch-Roy & Woodman, 2016). 
Examples for useful integration of secondary objectives in auction design 
Promoting small actors 
Germany currently considers preferential treatment for citizen cooperatives, by which a citizen cooperative is defined 
as being owned by at least 10 local natural persons with together 51% of voting rights, developing a maximum of one 
project per year. In France, bidders in the PV auctions must be the owner of the building and maintain the installation 
(Förster, 2016). 
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4.9 Transferability of support licenses 
Auction results can be efficient without allowing auction participants to transfer acquired support licenses to 
other projects (Ausubel & Cramton, 1999) (from Haufe & Ehrhart, 2016). In practice, the right to transfer a 
licence may be a useful design element in case the auction takes place at an early stage of the project 
planning. Transferability reduces the penalty risk for investors and may increase the target fulfilment as non-
realised projects can quickly be substituted. In summary, the pros and cons of transferability depend on the 
particular auction design and it should be left to MS to decide if they would allow transfers of support 
rights or not. 
 
4.10  Remuneration type and design 
Auctions can be combined with different remuneration options, in particular with feed-in tariffs (FIT), sliding 
premiums (or Contracts for Difference, CfD), fixed feed-in premium (FIP), or capacity-based payments (like 
investment grants).  
The choice between e.g. fixed and sliding premiums can have a significant influence on the auction outcome, 
i.e. who wins the support rights. Generally spoken, a sliding premium (or Contract for Difference, CfD) favours 
the projects with access to best resources, whereas a fixed premium favours projects with the best market 
values. As for fixed premiums, bidders are exposed to market price uncertainty. Empirical evidence shows 
that in such cases bidders with the most ‘positive outlook’ and not necessarily technologies with the best 
actual market values win, increasing the risk of a winner’s curse. FIT are usually deemed more advantageous 
for smaller investors with low risk bearing capacities. In addition, the bid price determination is easier since 
sophisticated market price forecasting models are less required. It has to be mentioned, though, that specific 
Example for experience with transferable support rights 
Germany introduced the right to transfer the support licences within the investor’s portfolio to a different location 
because of the outlined reasons. At the same time, strong opposition to the transferability of support licenses between 
bidders (i.e. a secondary market) by the industry could be observed as they feared unproductive speculation.  
Examples for seller concentration rules 
EU countries 
Portugal:  successful bidders in one round could not participate in the next round 
Germany:  bidders are allowed to submit more than one bid, but no single bidder can be awarded more than 10 
projects per auction 
Poland:  the planned auction will require a minimum number of three offers (bidders) 
Non-EU countries 
California:  one seller could not contract for more than 50% of capacity or revenue cap in each auction (across all 
bids)  
India:  the total capacity of solar PV projects to be allocated to a company is limited to 50 MW and the number or 
the size of bids per bidder may be limited 
Australia:  no bidder could submit bids for capacity that totalled more than 20 MW, ensuring that more than one 
proposal would be successful 
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design choices within both fixed and sliding premium systems can significantly alter the risk characteristics for 
investors.  
Requirements for market integration and balancing responsibility seem to be a natural complement to the 
market-based characteristics of auctions. When transferring related regulations from the state aid guidelines 
to REDII, two issues are important: 1) exemptions must be clearly defined (e.g. de minimis thresholds); and 2) 
definitions should be unambiguous. 
There are pros and cons for either remuneration type and design, and it is not within the scope here to 
conclude on certain preferred options – this shall be left to a more general discussion on support scheme 
design as a whole. 
 
5 Cross-border auctions 
An obvious reason for cross-border auctions is that cost savings can be achieved, i.e. a specified output of 
electricity can be generated at lower costs by two or more MS than it could by each MS providing the output 
individually. Thus, low cost potentials can become accessible to MS other than the one hosting the favourable 
sites. In addition, economies of scale and of scope can be achieved if two or more MS jointly organise an 
auction. Another benefit of cross-border auctions might be the increased competition and reduction of implicit 
collusion, which can again lead to efficiency gains.   
In practice, such efficiency arguments are of limited importance to MS. A lesson from the debate on 
cooperation mechanisms is that most MS are reluctant to pay support for RES installations in other countries, 
despite potential efficiency gains (Klessmann et al., 2014). A major reason for this reluctance is the 
(anticipated or actual) low public acceptance of such cross-border support. However, MS seem to increasingly 
recognise the benefits of regional market integration and cooperation. Some countries have started to 
cooperate on cross-border renewables support, at least for small support volumes. Auctions are a suitable 
instrument for such limited cross-border cooperation, as they imply strict volume control.   
Different options for the partial opening of national support schemes are being explored, which imply different 
levels of cooperation and alignment: unilaterally or mutually opened national auctions as well as joint auctions. 
REDII should provide a definition and description of the relevant options to guide MS in the 
implementation of cross-border auctions. 
We see that the general investment conditions significantly differ across MS. This applies for natural 
conditions such as resource availability etc., but also for general economic and policy-based conditions such 
as tax rates, fees, regulatory requirements and procedures, access to financing, and much more. It is 
impossible to create a complete level playing field across countries. There will always be differences between 
bidding conditions, which needs to be addressed outside the auction itself. If there are massive differences in 
regulatory and economic conditions, this may lead to distortions of auction results and thus create acceptance 
problems.  
Because of lack of experience with cross-border cooperation on support schemes and prevailing substantial 
differences in market conditions, it might be too early for REDII to generically require cross-border 
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auctions at this point in time. Requirements to cooperate might backfire, lead MS to abandon their own 
cooperation initiatives, and decrease acceptance of these initiatives as a whole. We are thus in favour of a 
solution in which REDII requires that MS should always investigate cross-border auctions as an option 
(i.e. in relation to mitigating suboptimal market conditions, as described in section 3.3), but where the actual 
implementation happens on a voluntary basis or based on sensible rules to gradually increase cross-
border participation. 
In case REDII require opening, it is important to provide a predictable and reasonable limit on the degree of 
opening, e.g. defined as a percentage of the total auction volume per year. MS currently fear unpredictable 
future increases of the opening requirement. In addition, MS should be free to limit opening up of auctions to 
certain technologies and auction rounds. Not all auctions should be required to open, e.g. for single-site 
auctions, which are common for offshore wind, a partial opening is impractical. Any opening requirement 
should allow MS to flexibly decide about which auctions should be opened as long as the required opening is 
achieved on average. Some countries prefer to limit the opening to countries from which electricity is 
‘physically imported’ or has a ‘physical effect’ on their own power system. As it is very complex to define and 
measure such physical effect, the opening may be practically limited to directly interconnected neighbours. In 
interviews by Klessmann et al. (2014), many MS identified physical import of electricity as an important 
element of cooperation, expecting that this would increase the benefits and acceptance of cross-border 
cooperation. It seems reasonable to allow for restricted cooperation with selected (neighbouring) MS in order 
to increase implementation practicability and acceptability of cross-border auctions at this point in time. 
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